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Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social
dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-
stay lose-shift strategy are known as strong competitors in iterated social dilemma games. On the other
hand, real repeated interaction generally allows plasticity (i.e., learning) of individuals based on the
experience of the past. Although plasticity is relevant to various biological phenomena, its role in
repeated social dilemma games is relatively unexplored. In particular, if experience-based learning
plays a key role in promotion and maintenance of cooperation, learners should evolve in the contest
with nonlearners under selection pressure. By modeling players using a simple reinforcement learning
model, we numerically show that learning enables the evolution of cooperation. We also show that
numerically estimated adaptive dynamics appositely predict the outcome of evolutionary simulations.
The analysis of the adaptive dynamics enables us to capture the obtained results as an afﬁrmative
example of the Baldwin effect, where learning accelerates the evolution to optimality.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The mechanisms of cooperation in social dilemma situations
are a central topic in interdisciplinary research ﬁelds including
evolutionary biology, ecology, economics, and sociology. As ana-
lyzed by the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and its relatives,
direct reciprocity is among the main known mechanisms under-
lying cooperative behavior (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). In
direct reciprocity, iterated interaction between the same indivi-
duals motivates them to continue cooperating (C) rather than to
defecting (D) to obtain momentarily large payoffs; defection
would be negatively rewarded by the opponent player’s retalia-
tion in later rounds. Variants of the celebrated retaliatory strategy
tit-for-tat (mimicking the opponent’s action in the previous
round) (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992) and a win-stay lose-shift
strategy (Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993)
are recognized as strong competitors in the iterated PD game.
In the iterated games concerning direct reciprocity, it is natural
to assume that players modify their strategies in response to their
experiences in past rounds. The tit-for-tat, its variants, and win-stay
lose-shift strategies can be interpreted as examples of such learningormation Science and Tech-
o, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan.
asuda).
 BY-NC-ND license.strategies because the tit-for-tat, for example, implies that the
player selects the action (i.e., C or D) depending on the result of
the last round. A more sophisticated learning player of this kind
exploits a longer history of the game for action selection (e.g.,
cooperate if the player and the opponent cooperated in the previous
two rounds, and defect otherwise, Lindgren, 1991). Classes of other
learning models include ﬁctitious play and reinforcement learning
(Camerer, 2003; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Learning apparently
seems beneﬁcial in iterated games because learning players are
more ﬂexible than nonlearning players.
If learning is a key factor in promoting cooperation in real
societies, the number of learning players should increase when a
population evolves under selection pressure. However, the advan-
tage of learners over nonlearners in evolutionary dynamics is
elusive because a pair of learning players often results in mutual
defection (Macy, 1996; Sandholm and Crites, 1996; Posch et al.,
1999; Taiji and Ikegami, 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002; Masuda
and Ohtsuki, 2009) and learning may be costly.
The constructive roles of learning in the evolution of certain
traits are collectively called the Baldwin effect (see Simpson,
1953; Turney et al., 1996; Weber and Depew, 2003; Crispo, 2007;
Badyaev, 2009 for reviews). Although earlier examples of the
Baldwin effect are not necessarily founded on ﬁrm empirical
evidence (Simpson, 1953; Weber and Depew, 2003), there exists a
plethora of positive evidence of the Baldwin effect. Examples
include ﬂy’s morphological developments (Waddington, 1942),
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persistence of coastal juncos (Yeh and Price, 2004). In fact, the
concept of the Baldwin effect differs by authors (see Simpson,
1953; Downes, 2003; Turney et al., 1996). Although earlier
computational models suggest that learning accelerates evolution
(Hinton and Nowlan, 1987; Ancel, 1999; Maynard Smith, 1987),
later theoretical and numerical studies suggest that learning
either accelerates or decelerates evolution toward the optimum
depending on the details of the models (Ancel, 2000; Dopazo
et al., 2001; Borenstein et al., 2006; Paenke et al., 2007, 2009).
The advantage of learning in evolution is also nontrivial in this
broader context.
We numerically investigate the effect of learning on evolution in
the iterated PD game. This question was explored in previous
literature (Suzuki and Arita, 2004; also see Wang et al., 2008 for
discussion). Our emphasis in this study is to use a reinforcement
learning model for the iterated PD game (Masuda and Nakamura,
2011) that is much simpler in terms of the number of plastic
elements than the plastic look-up-table model adopted in Suzuki
and Arita (2004). In our model, players are satisﬁed with and persist
in the current action when the obtained payoff is larger than a plastic
threshold. Our model of players introduced in Masuda and
Nakamura (2011) modiﬁes those in Karandikar et al. (1998), Posch
et al. (1999), Macy and Flache (2002). Via the stability analysis for
nonlearning players, the numerical analysis of the discretized adap-
tive dynamics with nonlearning and learning players, and full
evolutionary simulations, we show that learning is needed for a
noncooperative population to evolve to be able to engage in mutual
cooperation for wide parameter ranges. We also discuss our results
in the context of the Baldwin effect.2. Model
2.1. Iterated PD game
We assume that each player plays the PD game against each of
the other players in a population. In each round t ðt¼ 1;2, . . .Þ
within a generation, a player selects C or D without knowing the
action (i.e., C or D) of the opponent player. The payoff to the focal
player is deﬁned by
C
D
C D
R S
T P
 
, ð1Þ
where T4R4P4S and R4 ðTþSÞ=2. Eq. (1) represents the row
player’s payoff. The payoff to the opponent (column player) is
deﬁned likewise; the PD game is symmetric. Because T4R and
P4S, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium of the single-
shot PD game.
However, players may continue mutual cooperation for their
own beneﬁts in the iterated PD game (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod,
1984). We denote the number of rounds per generation by tmax .
Technically, the Nash equilibrium of the iterated PD game is
perpetual mutual defection if the players know tmax beforehand.
The number of rounds is often randomized to avoid this effect
(Axelrod, 1984). To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
players are unaware of the ﬁxed value of tmax.
Earlier studies identiﬁed tit-for-tat, which involves imitating
the previous action of the opponent, as a strong strategy in the
iterated PD game when various strategies coexist in a population
(Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). However, later studies showed
that tit-for-tat is not robust against error and that alternative
strategies such as generous tit-for-tat (Nowak and Sigmund,
1992) and Pavlov (Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and
Sigmund, 1993) are strong competitors in the iterated PD gamewith error. By deﬁnition, a Pavlov player receiving payoff T or R is
satisﬁed and does not change the action in the next round,
whereas the same player receiving payoff P or S is dissatisﬁed
and ﬂip the action. A population composed of Pavlov players, for
example, realizes mutual cooperation such that a player gains
approximately R per round.
2.2. Reinforcement learning
Intuitively, the ability to learn may seem to be an advanta-
geous trait in the iterated PD game if the cost of learning is
negligible. However, this is generally not the case. A pair of
learning players often ends up with mutual defection unless a
learning algorithm is carefully designed (Macy, 1996; Sandholm
and Crites, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Taiji and Ikegami, 1999; Macy
and Flache, 2002; Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2009). Learning requires
trial and error, i.e., the exploration of unknown behavioral
patterns as well as the exploitation of known advantageous
behavioral patterns. Exploratory behavior of a learning player
may look just random to opponents, and it is rational to defect
against random-looking players.
To compromise the possibility of mutual cooperation, the simpli-
city of the learning algorithm, and the biological plausibility of the
model as compared to some other learning algorithms, we use a
variant of the Bush–Mosteller (BM) reinforcement learning model
(Masuda and Nakamura, 2011). This model modiﬁes the models in
the previous literature (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999;
Macy and Flache, 2002) such that players learn to mutually coop-
erate for wide parameter ranges.
In round t, the cooperability of the learning player is given by
the probability pt. We update pt using the results of the single-
shot PD game as follows:
ptþ1 ¼
ptþð1ptÞst ðaction in round t is C, and stZ0Þ,
ptþptst ðaction in round t is C, and sto0Þ,
ptptst ðaction in round t is D, and stZ0Þ,
ptð1ptÞst ðaction in round t is D, and sto0Þ,
8>><
>>:
ð2Þ
where
st ¼ tanh ½bðrtAtÞ, ð3Þ
and rtAfR,T,S,Pg is the payoff to the player in round t. st stands for
the degree of satisfaction in round t. When st is large, the player
increases the probability of taking the current action in round
tþ1. For example, the third line in Eq. (2) indicates that the player
decreases the probability of cooperation pt because selecting D in
round t has yielded a satisfactory outcome. In addition, we
assume that the player misimplements the action with a small
probability E such that the player in fact cooperates with prob-
ability ð12EÞptþE in round t. Eqs. (2) and (3) indicate that the
player is satisﬁed with the current situation if the obtained payoff
rt is larger than the so-called aspiration level At. Otherwise, the
player is motivated to ﬂip the action. b controls the sensitivity in
the plasticity of pt. If b¼ 0, st¼0 for any t such that pt is constant.
If b¼1, st¼1 or 1 for any t such that ptþ1 ¼ 1 or 0.
Unless otherwise stated, we set the initial condition to p1 ¼ 0,
i.e., the player defects in round 1. This value of p1 is the most
adverse to mutual cooperation. We will conﬁrm in Sections 3.1
and 3.4 that our main results are qualitatively the same if we set
p1 ¼ 1.
The dynamics of the aspiration level are given by
Atþ1 ¼ ð1hÞAtþhrt , ð4Þ
where h represents the learning rate. If h¼0, At is constant, and
the model is equivalent to the classical BM model. If h¼1, the
player compares the current payoff and the payoff obtained in the
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mutual cooperation is established among the players only after
tmax ¼ 100 rounds if b is large and h is small (Masuda and
Nakamura, 2011). In the numerical simulations, we set b¼ 3,
which is large enough to support mutual cooperation if other
conditions, such as small h and small E, are met.
We remark that the initial condition A1 is a key parameter to
characterize the player.Table 1
Average payoff to a nonlearning player (row player) playing against an opponent
nonlearning player (column player). We set b¼1, 0oE51, and tmax ¼1.
st1 st2 st3 st4 st5
st1 RþTþSþP
4
Rþ2Sþ3P
6
RþTþSþP
4
Tþ2SþP
4
RþTþSþP
4
st2 Rþ2Tþ3P
6
P Rþ2Tþ2P
5
TþP
2
TþP
22.3. Evolutionary dynamics
We set the number of players in the population to N¼500. In a
single generation, each player i plays the iterated PD game with
tmax ¼ 200 against all the other players. We always reset pt and At
to p1 and A1 when a player starts the iterated PD game with a new
opponent. The single generation payoff r i ðA ½S,TÞ is equal to the
summation of the payoff obtained by playing against N1 players,
which is divided by ðN1Þtmax.
After the single generation payoffs to all the players are deter-
mined, we select two players i and j with equal probability for
strategy update. We use the Fermi rule (Szabo and Toke, 1998;
Traulsen et al., 2006) in which player i adopts j’s A1 and h values in
the next generationwith probability 1=½1þexp ð ~bðr ir jÞÞ, and player
j adopts i’s parameter values, otherwise. We set ~b ¼ 1. To account for
mutation, we assume that after strategy update, A1 and h of the
adopter are displaced by random small values obeying the uniform
density on ½DA1 ,DA1  and ½Dh,Dh, respectively. If the displaced h
exceeds 1 or is negative, we reset h to 1 or 0, respectively. However,
the resetting seldom occurs in our evolutionary simulations.
The phenotype of a player in round t is speciﬁed by pt and At. It
should be noted that pt and At are not inherited over generations.
In other words, the natural selection operates on the capacity to
learn (i.e., h) but not on the acquired behavior (i.e., pt and At).
Because we let b in Eq. (3) to be relatively large to realize mutual
cooperation (Masuda and Nakamura, 2011), pt is sensitive to the
excess payoff relative to At in the sense that pt is close to 0 or
1 unless rt is close to At. Therefore, pt is similar to the probability
of cooperation conditioned on the outcome of the PD game in the
previous round. When we use the term learning in the following,
we exclusively refer to that induced by h in the iterated PD game.
A positive value of h directly raises the plasticity of At and
indirectly controls that of pt.st3 RþTþSþP
4
Rþ2Sþ2P
5
R RþSþP
3
RþTþSþP
4
st4 2TþSþP
4
SþP
2
RþTþP
3
RþP
2
RþP
2
st5 RþTþSþP
4
SþP
2
RþTþSþP
4
RþP
2
RþTþSþP
4
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0
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2
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43. Results
3.1. Nash equilibria when without learning
To show that learning is necessary for the emergence of
cooperation, we start by analyzing the competition between
players that do not learn. With learning rate h equal to zero, the
aspiration level is ﬁxed over rounds (i.e., At ¼ A1, tZ1). For the
sake of analysis, we set b¼1. Then, Eqs. (2) and (3) imply that
the player persists in the current action (i.e., ðpt ,ptþ1Þ ¼ ð0;0Þ or
ð1;1ÞÞ if rtAtZ0 and ﬂips the action (i.e., ðpt ,ptþ1Þ ¼ ð0;1Þ or
ð1;0Þ) otherwise. When At is ﬁxed, there are ﬁve strategies:4
5 1.5-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1Strategy st1 is deﬁned by AtoS. Except for the action mis-
implemantation, an st1 player always cooperates or always
defects, depending on the action in the ﬁrst round.
opponent’s A1Strategy st2 is deﬁned by SoAtoP. An st2 player does not ﬂip
the action unless rt ¼ S.
Fig. 1. Average payoff to a nonlearning player (row player) playing against an
opponent nonlearning player (column player). We set b¼ 3, p1 ¼ 0, E¼ 0:02, h¼0,
tmax ¼ 200, R¼ 4, T ¼ 5, S¼ 0, and P¼2.Strategy st3 is deﬁned by PoAtoR. An st3 player does not ﬂip
the action if mutual cooperation or unilateral defection is
realized. It is equivalent to Pavlov, which is a strongcompetitor in the iterated PD game (Kraines and Kraines,
1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). Strategy st4 is deﬁned by RoAtoT . An st4 player ﬂips the
action unless rt ¼ T. Strategy st5 is deﬁned by ToAt . An st5 player ﬂips the action
in every round except when the player misimplements the
action.
In Table 1, the average payoff to a nonlearning (i.e., h¼0) player
(row player) playing against another nonlearning player (column
player) is shown for 0oE51 and tmax ¼1. For example, st1 playing
against st2 obtains ðRþ2Sþ3PÞ=6 per round on an average. The
results shown in Table 1 are a subset of those obtained in Nowak
et al. (1995) (see Appendix A for details). Table 1 indicates that st3 is
a Nash equilibrium when the ﬁve strategies are considered. In
particular, st3 playing against another st3 realizes mutual coopera-
tion and obtains the largest average payoff per round R. Therefore, a
unanimous population composed of st3 players represents a eusocial
situation. Mutual cooperation is not realized by any other combina-
tion of two players.
Table 1 indicates that st2 is also a Nash equilibrium when
3P4Rþ2S. In addition, although st4 is not a Nash equilibrium, a
homogeneous population composed of st4 players is resistant to
invasion by st3 in evolutionary situations because st4 gains a
larger payoff than st3 does when playing against an st4 opponent.
To test the robustness of the results shown in Table 1, we set
b¼ 3, E¼ 0:02, and h¼0, and numerically calculate the payoff
averaged over tmax generations to different nonlearning players
with different ﬁxed aspiration levels A1. We also set
R¼ 4, T ¼ 5, S¼ 0, and P¼2 in this and the following numerical
simulations. The average payoff to a nonlearner playing against
another nonlearner is shown for p1 ¼ 0 and tmax ¼ 200 in Fig. 1.
The presented values are averages over 100 trials for each pair of
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those shown in Table 1. We also conﬁrmed that the results hardly
change for ðp1,tmaxÞ ¼ ð0;2000Þ, ð1;200Þ, and ð1;2000Þ.
3.2. Possibility of mutual cooperation via learning
If h40, players different from st3 may adjust At until
PoAtoR is satisﬁed such that they learn to behave as Pavlov.
Therefore, learning may play a constructive role in the evolution
of mutual cooperation. In fact, this is not always the case; E40 is
a necessary condition for mutual cooperation to evolve.
To explain this point, we set b¼ 3 and h¼0.1, and numerically
examine the behavior of a pair of players. Typical time courses of
the aspiration level for a pair of learning players over rounds
without action misimplementation (i.e., E¼ 0) are shown in
Fig. 2(a). Each of the three pairs with close A1 values represents a
pair of st1 (thick lines), st3 (dotted lines), and st5 players (medium
lines), respectively. We used different values of A1 for each pair for
the clarity of the ﬁgure; making A1 equal for two players does not
qualitatively change the results. The thick lines in Fig. 2(a) indicate
that the two st1 players playing with each other are satisﬁed with
payoff P¼2 obtained by mutual defection. Therefore, their aspira-
tion levels converge to At ¼ P. The results would be the same if we
start from a pair of st2 players or a combination of an st1 player and
an st2 player. A pair of st3 players begin mutual cooperation from
the second round, and their At values converge to R¼4 (dotted
lines). Mutual cooperation is also realized if the two players are
initially either st4 or st5, although some rounds are required before
the players mutually cooperate (medium lines).
Although two learning players having AtoP do not end up with
mutual cooperation when E¼ 0, the action misimplementation (i.e.,
E40) can trigger a shift from mutual defection to mutual coopera-
tion. Artiﬁcially generated time courses in the presence of action
implementation are shown in Fig. 2(b) for expository purposes. Until
the intended action is misimplemented (1rtr29 in Fig. 2(b)), two
players starting with A1oP keep mutual defection (thick lines).
When At has sufﬁciently approached P, we assume that one player
misimplements the action (t¼30). Then, the At values of both players
cross P from below within a couple of rounds such that the players
start to behave as Pavlov and mutually cooperate. The possibility of
mutual cooperation through this mechanism is sensitive to the value
of h. Two players starting with A1oP end up with At4P owing to
the action misimplementation when ðPSÞ=ðTPÞo ð1hÞ2 (see
Appendix B for derivation). When T ¼ 5, S¼ 0, and P¼2, this
condition yields 0oho1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2=3
p
 0:184 for an arbitrary value
of R. Then, the At values of the two players converge to R.
The At values also converge to R when we start with a pair of
st3 players (dotted lines in Fig. 2(b)) and a pair of st4 or st5
players (medium lines in Fig. 2(b)). This is because mutual
cooperation is stable against action misimplementation; if one-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
A
t
t
Fig. 2. Behavior of a pair of learning players. We set b¼ 3, p1 ¼ 0, and h¼0.1. (a) Ex
horizontal lines represent At ¼ P¼ 2 and At ¼ R¼ 4. We set A1 for the two players to 
(b) Example time courses of the aspiration level when E¼ 0:02. We set A1 as in (a).
cooperate in round 30 (thick lines), to defect in round 30 (dotted lines), or to cooperaplayer turns into D by action misimplementation in round t, both
players defect in round tþ1 and cooperate in round tþ2, if the
actions are not misimplemented in rounds tþ1 and tþ2. This
event sequence is likely unless E is large.
3.3. Adaptive dynamics
In the evolutionary numerical simulations that we will describe in
Section 3.4, we allow the initial aspiration level A1 and learning rate h
to mutate (Section 2.3). If the distribution of A1 and that of h for an
evolving population are single peaked and sufﬁciently localized, we
can grasp the evolutionary dynamics for a population by tracking the
dynamics of the population averages of A1 and h, denoted by A1 and
h, respectively. In the extreme case in which all the players share
identical values of A1 and h, the instantaneous dynamics of A1 and h
are captured by adaptive dynamics (Metz et al., 1996; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998, 2003; Doebeli et al., 2004). Adaptive dynamics reveal
the possibility for mutants with a slightly deviated parameter value
to invade a homogeneous resident population. In this section, we
numerically examine two-dimensional adaptive dynamics with
respect to A1 and h to foresee the evolutionary simulations carried
out in Section 3.4.
In this and the following sections, we set b¼ 3, p1 ¼ 0, E¼ 0:02,
and tmax ¼ 200 unless otherwise stated. Consider a homogeneous
population of players sharing the parameter values A1 ¼ A1 and
h ¼ h. A mutant player with aspiration level A01 and learning rate
h0 can invade the population if
p½s0,sp½s,s40 ð5Þ
or
p½s0,sp½s,s ¼ 0 and p½s0,s0p½s,s040, ð6Þ
where s¼ ðA1,hÞ and s0 ¼ ðA01,h0Þ are the strategies of the resident
and mutant players, respectively, and p½s1,s2 represents the
average payoff of strategy s1 when playing with strategy s2. s is
ESS if the converse of Eq. (5) or the converse of Eq. (6) is satisﬁed.
If Eq. (5) or (6) is satisﬁed, the homogeneous population compris-
ing strategy s would evolve toward s0. We numerically calculate
p½s0,sp½s,s, where s0 ¼ ðA1þ0:2,hÞ, ðA10:2,hÞ, ðA1,hþ0:02Þ, and
ðA1,h0:02Þ. We conﬁne s0 in the neighborhood of s because the
amount of mutation for A1 and h is assumed to be small.
Examining p½s0,sp½s,s corresponds to looking at the discretized
adaptive dynamics, i.e., the discretized derivative of p½s0,s with
respect to s0 at s0 ¼ s.
For various values of A1 and h, p½s0,sp½s,s is shown in Fig. 3.
The plotted values are averages over 104 runs for any s. In
Fig. 3(a), s0 ¼ ðA1þ0:2,hÞ obtains a larger payoff than s¼ ðA1,hÞ in
the red region. In this region, s0 would invade a homogeneous
resident population of s such that A1 increases. In contrast, s
0
obtains a smaller payoff than s does in the blue region.-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
A
t
t
ample time courses of the aspiration level for a pair of players when E¼ 0. The
1 and 0.5 (thick lines), 2.5 and 3 (dotted lines), and 5.5 and 6 (medium lines).
For each pair, one of the two players is assumed to misimplement the action to
te in round 7 (medium lines).
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
h
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A1 A1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
h
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
0 5 10 15 20
A
t
t
Fig. 3. Discretized adaptive dynamics when E¼ 0:02. Plotted is p½s0 ,sp½s,s, where s¼ ðA1 ,hÞ and (a) s0 ¼ ðA1þ0:2,hÞ, (b) s0 ¼ ðA10:2,hÞ, (c) s0 ¼ ðA1 ,hþ0:02Þ, and (d)
s0 ¼ ðA1 ,h0:02Þ. (e) Example time courses of a pair of players having ðA1 ,hÞ ¼ ð1:7,0:1Þ and ðA1 ,hÞ ¼ ð2:2,0:1Þ (solid lines), and ðA1 ,hÞ ¼ ð1:7,0:1Þ and ðA1 ,hÞ ¼ ð2:2,0Þ (dotted
lines). The horizontal line indicates At ¼ P¼ 2. We set b¼ 3, p1 ¼ 0, and tmax ¼ 200.
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population starting from A1 ¼ 0, for example, is expected to
evolve such that A1 increases, but only up to A1  P¼ 2. Therefore,
a population does not evolve from st2 to st3 without learning.
Fig. 3(b), which reveals the possibility of invasion by mutant
s0 ¼ ðA10:2,hÞ in the resident population of s, is a sign ﬂipped
version of Fig. 3(a) in most parameter regions. Nevertheless, neither
the mutants with A01 ¼ A1þ0:2 nor the ones with A01 ¼ A10:2
invade the resident population (i.e., parameter regions colored in
blue in both Fig. 3(a) and (b)) for ðA1,hÞ  ð2;0Þ and along a bent line
passing through ðA1,hÞ  ð4;0Þ and ðA1,hÞ  ð4:3,0:2Þ. These regions
constitute singular points of the adaptive dynamics and serve as
repellers. In other words, A1 does not pass through  P¼ 2 for h¼0
and  R¼ 4 for various values of h in adaptive dynamics. The
observations for h¼0 that the homogeneous population of st2 is
not invaded by st3 mutants, that of st3 is not invaded by st2 or st4
mutants, and that of st4 is not invaded by st3 mutants, are consistent
with the results obtained in Section 3.1.
The possibility of invasion by mutant s0 ¼ ðA1,hþ0:02Þ in the
homogeneous population of s¼ ðA1,hÞ is shown in Fig. 3(c). The
ﬁgure suggests that h would increase for a population of st1
players (i.e., A1oS¼ 0). Learning is preferred to nonlearning
when A1o0 for the following reason. As shown in Section 3.2,
when h40 and E40, At increases until the players behave as
Pavlov to mutually cooperate within a relatively small number of
rounds (Fig. 2(b)). In contrast, the players do not establish mutual
cooperation when h¼0 or E¼ 0, as shown in Section 3.1
(Fig. 2(a)). Fig. 3(c) indicates that h increases up to h  0:15. This
value of h is consistent with the upper bound of h for mutual
cooperation to be possible, which was derived in Section 3.2.
Based on these results, h is expected to initially increase in
evolutionary dynamics starting with a population of nonlearningst1 players. We refer to the stage of evolutionary dynamics in
which h increases as stage 1. The existence of stage 1 is also
supported by Fig. 3(d) in which the mutant has s0 ¼ ðA1,h0:02Þ.
After h has increased, Fig. 3(a) and (b) implies that A1 increases to
cross P¼2. When h40, a larger value of A1 ðoPÞ is beneﬁcial
because fewer rounds are required for such players to turn to Pavlov
(i.e., At4P). Once A1 exceeds P for a majority of players, they earn a
large average payoff  R through mutual cooperation. We refer to
the transition for learning players from a small A1 corresponding to
st1 or st2 to a large A1 corresponding to st3 as stage 2. Fig. 3(a) and
(b) indicates that the difference between p½s0,s and p½s,s when A1,
A1þ0:2oP, h40 is small, presumably because s and s0 are only
slightly different in terms of the number of transient rounds before
the entrance to A14P. Therefore, we expect that stage 2 occurs
slowly in evolutionary dynamics.
Although it is a minor phenomenon as compared to stages
1 and 2, a smaller h is more beneﬁcial on the boundary between
st2 and st3 (i.e., At  P¼ 2), as shown in Fig. 3(c) and (d). For
expository purposes, time courses of the iterated PD game
between an st2 player and an st3 player are shown in Fig. 3(e).
As shown by the solid lines, the initial st3 player ﬂips to st2 before
establishing mutual cooperation if h40. In fact, a nonlearning st3
player (i.e., h¼0) realizes mutual cooperation with a learning st2
player in earlier rounds (dotted lines) than a learning st3 player
does (solid lines). Therefore, in evolutionary dynamics, h in the
vicinity of At  P is expected to decrease. We refer to this
transition as stage 3. It should be noted that stage 3 occurs in a
narrow range of A1 (i.e., A1oP and A1þ0:24P in Fig. 3(a)).
Through stages 1, 2, and 3, evolution from a defective popula-
tion of nonlearning st1 players to a cooperative population of st3
players is logically possible. In contrast, the emergence of mutual
cooperation is hampered if learning is prohibited.
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repellers in adaptive dynamics, as already explained in
Fig. 3(a) and (b). When PoA1oR (i.e., 2oA1o4), the mutant’s
payoff is indistinguishable from the resident’s payoff unless h is
large (Fig. 3(a)–(d)). Therefore, A1 and h would perform approxi-
mately unbiased diffusion. This implies that h that has decreased
via stage 3 may increase again.
When at least one of the two players is st4 or st5, a player with
a larger A1 is more advantageous than the opponent with a
smaller A1. This is because the former exploits the latter in early
rounds. Nevertheless, these players do not obtain the average
payoff as large as that for a pair of st3 players, which would start
to mutually cooperate from the second round. Therefore, st3 is
stable against invasion by st4 and vice versa.
We predict that the learning rate would not eventually decrease
to the small value in evolutionary simulations. In other words, the
disadvantage of learning is too small to be evolutionarily relevant
unless the cost of learning is explicitly incorporated.
To assess the robustness of the results obtained from the adaptive
dynamics, we reproduced Fig. 3(a)–(d) with E¼ 0:05 and E¼ 0:1. The
results for E¼ 0:05 are qualitatively the same as those for E¼ 0:02
(results not shown). The results for E¼ 0:1 are different in some
aspects from those for E¼ 0:02 (Fig. 4). Most notably, when E¼ 0:1,
st3 is no longer stable against invasion by st2 even without learning
(i.e., h¼0). Therefore, mutual cooperation would not be stable in
evolutionary dynamics. In Fig. 5(a) and (b), p½s0,sp½s,s is shown for
ðs,s0Þ ¼ ðð1:9,0Þ,ð2:1,0ÞÞ and ðs,s0Þ ¼ ðð2:1,0Þ,ð1:9,0ÞÞ, respectively, for a
variety of values of tmax and E. Fig. 5(a) indicates that an st3 mutant
does not invade the population of st2 residents for all the examined
values of tmax and E. Fig. 5(b) indicates that a population of st3
residents is resistant to invasion by st2 mutants when tmax is large
and E ð40Þ is small. Nevertheless, st3 is stable for various values of
tmax and E. Because stage 2 is hampered when E¼ 0, E must take an
intermediate value for the learning-mediated mutual cooperation to
emerge.10 100 1000
tmaxtmax
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
10 100 1000
0.001
Fig. 5. Effects of tmax and E on the adaptive dynamics when A1  P and h¼0. We
set b¼ 3 and p1 ¼ 0. (a) p½ð2:1,0Þ,ð1:9,0Þp½ð1:9,0Þ,ð1:9,0Þ. (b) p½ð1:9,0Þ,ð2:1,0Þ
p½ð2:1,0Þ,ð2:1,0Þ.3.4. Evolutionary simulations
The results in Section 3.3 predict the presence of a learning
mediated evolutionary route from a noncooperative population
composed of st1 players to a cooperative population composed of
st3 players. In this section, we carry out direct numerical simula-
tions of the evolutionary dynamics using a population composed0
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h
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A1
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0.05
0.1
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0.2
h
-1
Fig. 4. Discretized adaptive dynamics when E¼ 0:1. Plotted is p½s0 ,sp½s,s, where s
s0 ¼ ðA1 ,h0:02Þ.of N¼500 players. We initially set h¼0 and select A1 for each
player independently from the uniform density on ½S1,S. There-
fore, all the players are initially nonlearning st1. Refer to Section
2.3 for details of the numerical setup.
The evolution of h, the total amount of plasticity experienced
in a generation, deﬁned by
Ptmax1
t ¼ 1 9Atþ1At9, r , and the fraction
of mutual cooperation for an example run with DA1 ¼ 0:05 and
Dh ¼ 0:01 are shown in Fig. 6(a). The average learning rate h and
the total amount of plasticity rapidly increase until the  3:9
104 th round. The payoff and the fraction of mutual cooperation
also increase during this period because st1 players learn to
behave as Pavlov when h40. This period corresponds to stage
1 described in Section 3.3. Then, the fraction of mutual coopera-
tion and the total amount of plasticity gradually increase until the
 3:5 105 th round, corresponding to stage 2. In the  3:5 105
th round, an st3 mutant emerges in the population mostly
composed of st2 players and gains a larger payoff than st2
residents do. Then, st3 players rapidly replace st2 players in the
population such that r=R and the fraction of mutual cooperation
suddenly increase (Fig. 6(a)). This is because stable mutual
cooperation between st3 players emerges in an early round,
whereas that between st2 players emerges after  2=E rounds.
The learning rate decreases almost at the same time, correspond-
ing to stage 3. The time courses of the fractions of st1, st2, st3, st4,
and st5 players corresponding to the run shown in Fig. 6(a) are
shown in Fig. 6(b). For example, the fraction of the st1 player is
deﬁned by the fraction of players having A1oS and any value of h.-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
A1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
¼ ðA1 ,hÞ and (a) s0 ¼ ðA1þ0:2,hÞ, (b) s0 ¼ ðA10:2,hÞ, (c) s0 ¼ ðA1 ,hþ0:02Þ, and (d)
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Fig. 6. Evolutionary dynamics in a population composed of learning players. We set b¼ 3, p1 ¼ 0, E¼ 0:02, tmax ¼ 200, DA1 ¼ 0:05, and Dh ¼ 0:01. (a) Time course of
h ,
Ptmax 1
t ¼ 1 9Atþ1At9=20, r=R, and the fraction of mutual cooperation. (b) Time course of the fraction of initially st1, st2, st3, st4, and st5 players in the run shown in (a).
(c) Sample trajectory of the population averages A1 and h in the run shown in (a).
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Fig. 7. Sample trajectory of A1 and h when b¼ 3, p1 ¼ 1, E¼ 0:02, tmax ¼ 200,
DA1 ¼ 0:05, and Dh ¼ 0:01.
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players evolves to that of st3 players. The trajectory of A1 and h
corresponding to the same run is shown in Fig. 6(c). Fig. 6(c) is
consistent with the scenario of the evolution of cooperation
described in Section 3.3. The population evolves from no coopera-
tion to mutual cooperation via the three stages involving learning.
After stage 3, A1 and h diffuse without a recognizable bias, which
is also consistent with the results obtained in Section 3.3 (white
regions in Fig. 3(a)–(d)). However, it should be noted that the
total amount of plasticity remains small after stage 3.
To examine the robustness of the results, we carry out ﬁve
runs of numerical simulations for each of the different parameter
sets; we could not carry out more extensive numerical simula-
tions because of the computational cost. We measure two
quantities in each run. The ﬁrst quantity is the number of
generations necessary for h to exceed 0.1 for the ﬁrst time. We
call this number the end of stage 1. The second quantity is the
number of generations necessary for A1 to exceed P for the ﬁrst
time. We call this number the end of stage 2. The ends of stages
1 and 2 with E¼ 0:02, DA1 ¼ 0:05, and Dh ¼ 0:01 are equal to
257728 ð102Þ and 376371514 ð102Þ, respectively, where the
mean 7 standard deviation on the basis of the ﬁve runs are
indicated. Those with E¼ 0:05, DA1 ¼ 0:05, and Dh ¼ 0:01 are equal
to 299755 ð102Þ and 695174231 ð102Þ. Those with E¼ 0:01,
DA1 ¼ 0:05, and Dh ¼ 0:01 are equal to 265731 ð102Þ and
378071547 ð102Þ. Those with E¼ 0:02, DA1 ¼ 0:02, and
Dh ¼ 0:01 are equal to 239718 ð102Þ and 915176836 ð102Þ.
For this parameter set, one out of the ﬁve runs did not reach the
end of stage 2 within 2 106 generations, such that the statistics
are based on the other four runs. Those with E¼ 0:02, DA1 ¼ 0:05,
and Dh ¼ 0:005 are equal to 6137119 ð102Þ and 35047
999 ð102Þ. Mutual cooperation evolves via learning (i.e., ﬁnite
value of the end of stage 2 up to our numerical efforts) in most
cases. When E¼ 0:05, evolution to mutual cooperation is slower
than when E¼ 0:02. This may be because learning players having
different values of A1 turn into Pavlov (i.e., At4P) within a small
number of rounds when E is relatively large. Then, the payoff todifferent learning players would differ relatively little to weaken
the selection pressure.
We perform another robustness test. For the original para-
meter values E¼ 0:02, DA1 ¼ 0:05, and Dh ¼ 0:01, the trajectory of
A1 and h obtained from a single run with p1 ¼ 1 is shown in Fig. 7.
The results are qualitatively the same as those for p1 ¼ 0 (Fig. 6(c))
although establishment of cooperation takes a considerably larger
number of generations when p1 ¼ 1 than when p1 ¼ 0.3.5. Baldwin effect
If we assume an explicit cost of learning, the learning rate
decreases after mutual cooperation is reached. An example time
course of A1 and h when a linear cost ch is added to the single
generation payoff to each player (Suzuki and Arita, 2004; see
Ancel, 1999, 2000 for a different implementation of the explicit
learning cost), where c¼1, is shown in Fig. 8(a). The ﬁnal value
of h is smaller than that in the case without the learning cost
(Fig. 6(c)). The result shown in Fig. 6(d) is an example of the
standard Baldwin effect in which the learning rate initially
increases and then decreases (Ancel, 2000; Dopazo et al., 2001;
Borenstein et al., 2006; Paenke et al., 2007, 2009).
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Fig. 8. (a, b) Sample trajectory of A1 and h under a linear cost of learning. We set (a) c¼1 and (b) c¼10. (c) Largest h in each of the ﬁve runs of 106 generations for various
values of c. A cross corresponds to a single run. (d) Average of h over the last 104 generations in each run. (e) Average of A1 over the last 10
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against the variation of c. An example time course of A1 and h
when c¼10 is shown in Fig. 8(b). As compared to when c¼1
(Fig. 8(a)), h is smaller throughout the evolution, and A1 increases
more slowly. Nevertheless, the population mostly consists of st3
players in the end. We carried out ﬁve runs for various values of c.
The largest h value in 106 generations is shown in Fig. 8(c) for
each run. The largest h value decreases with c because learning is
costly for a large value of c. The ﬁnal value of h, calculated as the
average over the last 104 generations, is shown in Fig. 8(d). The
ﬁnal value of h is considerably smaller than the largest value
(Fig. 8(c)) for each c, indicative of stage 3 of the Baldwin effect.
The ﬁnal value of A1 , calculated as the average over the last 10
4
generations, is plotted against c in Fig. 8(e). If this value is larger
than P¼2 and smaller than R¼4, we expect that the ﬁnal
population is mostly composed of st3 players and that the
Baldwin effect is operative. Fig. 8(e) suggests that the Baldwin
effect occurs in the ﬁve runs when co15. When cZ15, stage 1,
i.e., the initial increase in h, is often too small in magnitude such
that stage 2 does not sometimes occur. We conclude that the
Baldwin effect occurs for a wide range of c.4. Discussion
We have shown that reinforcement learning promotes the
evolution of mutual cooperation in a population of players
involved in the iterated PD game. Cooperation evolves under
some conditions such as 3P4Rþ2S, positive but not too large
values of E, and tmax that is not too small. The present study is
motivated by previous investigations of the Baldwin effect. Our
results provide an example of the Baldwin effect in the form of a
computational model of social behavior.
To understand the behavior of our model analytically, writing
down the Fokker–Planck equation for the joint density of A1 and h
may be useful. Starting from the singular density at a small value
of A1 and h¼0, we may be able to solve the Fokker–Planck
equation numerically to track the evolution of the joint density
to ﬁnd the Baldwin effect. Alternatively, discretizing A1 and h and
then formulating a Markov chain on the discretized states mayalso be useful. Nevertheless, we refrained from such analyses
because we consider that they eventually necessitates some
numerical simulations and would not sufﬁciently advance the
understanding of our numerical results.
The concept of the Baldwin effect is diverse (Simpson, 1953;
Downes, 2003; Turney et al., 1996). However, arguably, the most
accepted variant of the Baldwin effect is formulated as a two-
stage mechanism (Simpson, 1953; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Crispo,
2007; Turney et al., 1996). In stage 1, plasticity increases because
plastic individuals are better at ﬁnding the optimal behavior than
nonplastic individuals. In stage 2, mutation makes the optimal
behavior innate and decreases the plasticity of individuals.
Mutants that play optimally from the outset of their life without
plasticity and resident individuals that acquire the optimal
behavior through plasticity are eventually equally efﬁcient.
Nevertheless, because of the cost of learning, the mutants over-
whelm the residents via natural selection. Stage 2 is often called
genetic assimilation.
Stage 1 in our model corresponds to stage 1 of the standard
Baldwin effect outlined above. In stage 2 in our model, A1
increases such that the optimal behavior (i.e., mutual cooperation
by turning into st3) becomes innate. Nevertheless, after stage 3
in our model in which the learning rate rapidly decreases,
the learning rate starts to perform a random walk because the
learning cost is marginal in our model (Fig. 6(c)). Therefore, the
behavior of our model in stages 2, 3, and onward does not qualify
as stage 2 of the standard Baldwin effect in which the learning
rate decreases. With a modiﬁed model with an explicit learning
cost, we showed that the learning rate decreases after stage 3
(Fig. 6(d)). In this case, our model naturally ﬁts the framework of
the Baldwin effect.
In a previous computational model of the Baldwin effect,
learning rates remain large when the optimal behavior dynamically
changes owing to environmental ﬂuctuations (Ancel, 1999). In our
model without an explicit cost of learning, the learning rate remains
large for a different reason. In our model, the optimal parameter set
(i.e., A1 and h) does not ﬂuctuate after sufﬁcient generations.
Instead, approximate optimality is realized for various parameter
sets, i.e., any PoA1oR and hZ0. Therefore, the learning rate
performs a randomwalk to occasionally visit large values (Fig. 6(c)).
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why stage 1 cannot be skipped in the two-stage mechanism of
the Baldwin effect. First, learning may provide a breathing space
by which a population can survive long enough to transit to stage
2. This reason is irrelevant to our model because our model is not
concerned with the survival of the population. The population
size is ﬁxed in our model such that the population always
survives. Second, the preferred state may be accessible for
learners but not for nonlearners. Although not explicitly stated
in Godfrey-Smith (2003), this mechanism seems to be relevant to
cases in which the ﬁtness landscape does not depend on the
conﬁguration of the population. In our case, however, the ﬁtness
landscape depends on the fractions of the different types of
players because the payoff to a player is affected by the strategies
of the other players. Third, evolution may change the ‘‘social
ecology’’ of the population such that learners are more advanta-
geous than nonlearners, a phenomenon called niche construction
in a broad sense. The social ecology implies a ﬁtness landscape
that depends on the conﬁguration of the population. In our model,
the social ecology evolves via learning of players. This third
mechanism seems to be relevant to our model. Suppose a
hypothetical population comprising st1 nonlearners except two
st1 learners. For a focal st1 learner, the social ecology is such that
there is one st1 learner and N2 st1 nonlearners. If E40, the focal
st1 learner is likely to gain a payoff that is larger than an st1
nonlearner because the focal player learns to mutually cooperate
with the other st1 learner, whereas an st1 nonlearner does not.
The focal st1 learner would not overwhelm st1 nonlearners if the
other st1 learner is absent in the social ecology.
The main purpose of this study is to provide an evolutionary
model of concrete social behavior in which learning plays a
constructive role. We are not the ﬁrst to achieve this end.
Suzuki and Arita (2004) observed the Baldwin effect in the
iterated PD game using different learning models. In their model,
the learning rate is assumed to be binary, and the player’s
strategy is speciﬁed by a look-up table that associates the
action to take (i.e., C or D) with the actions of the previous two
rounds of the two players. The entries of the look-up table
dynamically change when the plasticity is in operation. They also
considered the effects of meta-learning in which the player
adapts how to update each entry of the look-up table. The main
contribution of the present work relative to theirs is to provide a
much simpler model in terms of the number of plastic
parameters. In contrast, the learning rates and the range of
parameters are continuous in our model, whereas they are mostly
binary in their model. Our model may be amenable to real
animals and facilitates a mechanistic understanding of evolu-
tionary dynamics by the numerically calculated adaptive
dynamics. Apart from the ﬁxed parameters common to all the
individuals, our players only have two parameters that are plastic
within a generation, pt and At, and two parameters inherited
across generations, A1 and h. The results obtained from the
adaptive dynamics predict those of direct evolutionary numerical
simulations and provide an intuitive reason why learning pro-
motes the emergence of mutual cooperation. In particular, we
showed the necessity of the evolution of learning ability for
cooperation by explicitly comparing the cases with and without
learning. The combination of adaptive dynamics and evolutionary
simulations may also be useful for analyzing the Baldwin effect in
different models.Acknowledgements
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No. 20115009)) from MEXT, Japan.Appendix A. Payoff to nonlearning players
Nowak et al. (1995) analyzed iterated matrix games between a
pair of players that select an action (i.e., C or D) in response to the
actions of the two players in the previous round. There are four
combinations of the actions of the two players in the previous
round, i.e., (C,C), (C,D), (D,C) and (D, D). Because a player assigns C
or D to each of these possible outcomes in the previous round,
there are 16 strategies Si ð0r ir15Þ. In fact, st1, st2, st3, st4, and
st5 in the present study are equivalent to S12, S8, S9, S1, and S3 in
Nowak et al. (1995), respectively.
By calculating the steady state of the Markov chain with four
states R, T, S, and P. Nowak et al. (1995) calculated the average
payoff to focal player Si playing against the opponent Sj
ð0r i, jr15Þ under a small probability of error in action imple-
mentation. Their assumption for the action misimplementation is
slightly different from ours. We assumed that E is the probability
that each player independently misimplements the action,
whereas only one of the two players may misimplement the
action in a round in their model. Nevertheless, our model is
equivalent to theirs in the limit E-0 if we set E0 ¼ 2Eð1EÞ, where
E0 is the probability of action misimplementation in the sense of
Nowak et al. (1995). Therefore, our results shown in Table 1 are a
corollary of their results.Appendix B. Upper bound of h for st2 players to turn into
Pavlov
Given b¼1, 0oE51,h40, and A1oP, At of the two players,
denoted by X and Y, are sufﬁciently close to P when one player,
which we assume to be Y without loss of generality, misimplements
the action to select C for the ﬁrst time in round tp2=E. Without any
further action misimplementation, X keeps D and Y ﬂips to D in
round tþ1 because AðYÞtþ1oPoAðXÞtþ1. In round tþ2, X ﬂips to C and Y
keeps D. Therefore, we obtain AðXÞtþ3 ¼ hSþð1hÞAðXÞtþ2, AðXÞtþ2 ¼
hPþð1hÞAðXÞtþ1, AðXÞtþ1 ¼ hTþð1hÞAðXÞt , and AðXÞt  P. Combining the
four equations, we obtain
AðXÞtþ3 ¼ ðTPÞh
32ðTPÞh2þðTþS2PÞhþP: ð7Þ
Using T4P4S and 0ohr1, we obtain the condition for X to
become Pavlov in round tþ3 as AðXÞtþ34P, i.e.,
ð1hÞ24 PS
TP : ð8Þ
The condition for Y to become Pavlov in round tþ3 is given by
AðYÞtþ34P, i.e.,
ð1hÞ2o TP
PS : ð9Þ
Eq. (8) implies Eq. (9) because ðPSÞ=ðTPÞ40 and h40. Therefore,
the two players become Pavlov in round tþ3 if Eq. (8) holds true.
We assume that Eq. (8) is violated. If Eq. (9) is also violated, we
obtain AðXÞt0 ,A
ðYÞ
t0 rP ðt0Ztþ3Þ such that the two players mutually
defect until the occurrence of another action misimplementation.
If Eq. (9) is satisﬁed, the two players mutually defect in round
tþ3. Because rðYÞtþ2 ¼ rðXÞt ¼ T , rðYÞtþ3 ¼ rðXÞtþ1 ¼ P, and AðYÞtþ2oP, we
obtain PoAðYÞtþ4oA
ðXÞ
tþ2. Because r
ðXÞ
tþ2 ¼ rðYÞt ¼ S, rðXÞtþ3 ¼ rðYÞtþ1 ¼ P,
and AðXÞtþ24P, we obtain A
ðYÞ
tþ2oA
ðXÞ
tþ4oP. These two inequalities
S. Tanabe, N. Masuda / Journal of Theoretical Biology 293 (2012) 151–160160indicate that X and Y behave as st3 and st2 in round tþ5,
respectively. By repeating the same procedure with X and Y
swapped, we obtain
AðYÞtþ2oA
ðYÞ
tþ6oPoA
ðXÞ
tþ6oA
ðXÞ
tþ2: ð10Þ
Therefore, we obtain
AðYÞtþ2oA
ðYÞ
tþ2þ4ioPoA
ðXÞ
tþ2þ4ioA
ðXÞ
tþ2 ðiZ1Þ ð11Þ
by induction. Eq. (11) implies that the two players do not realize
mutual cooperation if Eq. (8) is violated.
Therefore, an upper bound of h for a pair of st2 players to turn
into Pavlov is given by solving Eq. (8) with equality.
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